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THE EARNED INCOME DEDUCTION:
CONGRESS'S 1981 RESPONSE TO THE
"MARRIAGE PENALTY" TAX
Pamela B. Gannt
The effect of marital status on the allocation of income tax burdens
has been a recurrent problem in our federal income tax system. Na-
tional interest in this subject reached a historic apogee in 1948, when
Congress abandoned treatment of the individual as the taxpayer unit
and adopted the split-income plan of joint returns for married persons.
Congress took this action to discourage common law states from adopt-
ing the community property system solely because of the federal tax
treatment of married persons.' Another less seismic climax occurred in
1980 with respect to the so-called marriage-penalty tax.2 This problem
had attracted sufficient national attention that in 1980 the House Ways
and Means Committee held hearings3 and the Joint Committee on Tax-
ation published a staff report on the subject. 4 The same year, the Tax
Court decided Boyter v. Commissioner, 5 in which it refused to recognize a
sham divorce obtained at the end of a tax year. The Boyters, a Mary-
land couple, had divorced in Haiti in December, 1975 and immediately
remarried in the beginning of the next tax year, in an ultimately unsuc-
cessful effort to escape the marriage penalty. Such divorces had cap-
" Professor of Law, Duke University.
1 Under community property laws, each spouse has a present one-half interest in the
spouse's entire earned income and in all unearned income derived from their community
property. Husbands and wives therefore filed separate returns for their respective one-half
shares of the community income. The lowest combined tax liability of married persons under
the progressive tax-rate structure occurred when income was evenly divided. Consequently,
the fact of marriage frequently lowered the tax liability of married persons in community
property states. The Revenue Act of 1948 allowed married couples to report their combined
income on a joint return and to calculate their tax liability by determining taxes owed on
one-half of the total combined income and then multiplying that amount by two. Revenue
Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, ch. 168, §§ 301-305, 62 Stat. 110, 114-16 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
2 The "marriage penalty" refers to the higher tax liability of married two-worker
couples, compared to their nonmarried counterparts. See in/a text following note 18 and
table 1.
3 See TaH Treatment of Mamid Head of Household and Single Tapayers: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Tax Treatment
Hearings].
4 See STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON TAxATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE INCOME TAX
TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter
cited as JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT].
5 74 T.C. 989 (1980).
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tured the attention of the press, and the Boyters themselves testified at
the 1980 congressional hearings on the marriage penalty.6
Again, as in 1948, Congress could no longer ignore the issue of mar-
ital status and income taxes. Politically forced to respond, Congress in-
cluded in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) a provision
that allows an earned income deduction to married couples when both
spouses work, thereby partially eliminating the marriage penalty.7 This
article examines the 1981 congressional response to the issue. Because
this writer8 and many others9 previously have reviewed the history of
marital status as a factor in our income tax system, this article assumes
the reader's familiarity with the genesis of the marriage penalty. It be-
gins instead with a review of the nonneutrality of matrimonial status in
allocating tax burdens as of 1979. Next, it discusses the provisions of
ERTA that affect the relationship between marital status and income
taxes. The primary provision is the earned income deduction for mar-
ried couples, but the twenty-three percent reduction of tax rates also has
a substantial impact. The article shows that the earned income deduc-
tion cannot be supported on an equity criterion of marriage neutrality,
but that it does produce some efficiency gains. Finally, this article ex-
plains why the ERTA changes are palliative reactions by Congress and
argues that a more nearly marriage-neutral income tax system, under
which all individuals file separate returns under a single rate schedule, is
a more satisfactory resolution. 10
A. Marriage Nonneutrality as of 1979
In analyzing the equity objectives to be achieved by allocating in-
come tax burdens on the basis of marital status, commentators typically
apply one or more of the following criteria:"
1. The income tax should be progressive so that taxpayers with
greater incomes will pay a larger percentage of their income in taxes
than will taxpayers with lesser incomes.
6 See Tax Treatment Hearings, supra note 3, at 163-68.
7 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103, 95 Stat. 172, 187-88
(codified at I.R.C. § 221) [hereinafter cited as ERTA].
8 See Gann, Abandoning Marital Status As a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 10-24 (1980).
9 See, e.g., Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975);
McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation of the Famiy in a Comprehensive and Simplifed Income Tax, 90
"HARv. L. REv. 1573 (1977); see also Tax Treatment Hearings, supra note 3; Economic Problems of
Women: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 221-87 (1973-74);
JOINT COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 4; TREASURY DEP'T BLUEPRINTS FOR BAsic TAX
REFORM 102-07, 172-76 (1977).
10 See also Gann, supra note 8, at 32-51 (exploring superiority of marriage-neutral income
tax system in terms of equity and efficiency).
11 See id at 9; see also Bittker, supra note 9, at 1395-96 (discussing inevitable conflict
between concept of marital-status neutrality and tax equality).
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2. Equal-income married couples should pay equal taxes.
3. The income tax should be marriage neutral in that the sum
of the individual tax liabilities of two persons should not change when
they marry each other.
Our income tax system is based on the first two criteria. It is a
progressive tax system, and married taxpayers typically consolidate their
income on a joint tax return under a separate tax rate schedule so that
married couples with equal incomes pay equal taxes. The third crite-
rion, marriage neutrality, cannot simultaneously be achieved with the
first two criteria, 12 and since 1948, Congress has chosen to forego the
third criterion in favor of the second. What are the various effects of this
choice under equity analysis?
1. Comparison of One- Worker and Two- Worker Married Couples
Congress adopted the second criterion in 1948 by enacting the split-
income plan for married persons, but in failing to define a broad statu-
tory income tax base, it enacted a flawed implementation scheme. Con-
sequently, Congress adopted the view that "married couples with equal
statulto income should pay equal taxes," although their actual eco-
nomic income and ability to pay taxes may be substantially dissimilar.
Two simple examples illustrate this point. Married couples A and B
each have $50,000 of income. Couple A has $50,000 of earned income
and Couple B has $50,000 of tax-exempt interest earned on municipal
bonds. These couples have the same economic income (assuming negli-
gible expenses to earn that income), but couple A pays substantial fed-
eral taxes and couple B pays none. Alternatively, consider married
couples C and D, each with $50,000 of earned income. In the case of
couple C, the husband earns a $50,000 salary (incurring negligible ex-
penses to earn that income), and the wife provides at least $15,000 of
home production. In the case of couple D, the husband and wife both
work outside the home and earn total salaries of $50,000. They produce
only $5,000 of home production themselves, and pay a third person
$10,000 a year to perform household services. Couple C has substan-
tially more economic income than does couple D. They have the same
statutory income, however, and pay the same federal taxes.
By 1980, the split-income system for married persons and the simul-
taneous exclusion of the value of home production from the income tax
base had become a significant source of inequity in the allocation of
income tax burdens. By failing to account for married couples' alloca-
tions of labor between the marketplace and home, the system consis-
tently overtaxed two-worker couples in comparison to one-worker
12 See generaly Bittker, supra note 9, at 1395-97; Gann, supra note 8, at 9 n.31 (demon-
strating algebraically that goals of marriage neutrality and equal taxation for equal-income
married couples will always conflict in progressive tax-rate system).
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couples. This overtaxation was compounded by the nondeductibility of
additional transportation, meal, and clothing expenses incurred by two-
worker couples when the second worker entered the job market. The
only allowance Congress made for such additional expenditures was the
tax credit for child care expenditures that resulted from the second
worker's participation in the labor force. 13 The inequities of the split-
income system had increased since its enactment in 1948 because of the
increasing participation of wives in the labor force. In 1948, only about
twenty percent of wives worked outside the home, 14 and because hus-
bands earned most of the labor income, the split-income system of 1948
reduced the tax burdens of most married couples. Moreover, the omis-
sion of home production from the tax base probably did not cause sub-
stantial inequities between one-worker and two-worker couples. By
1980, however, over fifty percent of married women worked outside the
home. 15 Given this large number and the likely variances in allocation
of time by these wives between market and home production, the failure
to include home production in the tax base became increasingly
inequitable.
Because of the increased participation of wives in the labor force,
by 1980 two-worker couples had also become the most prevalent tax-
payer group, measured by amount of taxes paid. In the 1979 tax year,
two-worker married couples paid 37.7% of total individual income tax
revenues, while one-worker married couples represented the next highest
group at 37.3%.16 Also, by 1979, one-worker couples represented only
24.5% of all tax returns filed.17
Congress's adoption in 1948 of the criterion that "equal-income
married couples should pay equal taxes," reflected a tax system designed
for a society largely composed of one-worker married couples. It repre-
sented a political solution to an equity problem that yielded a substan-
tial tax reduction for most taxpayers. By 1980, however, two-earner
married couples composed the single largest group of taxpayers in
amount of revenues paid and one-earner married couples represented
only 24.5% of all tax returns filed. Thus, by 1980, the 1948 solution
benefited a substantially smaller number of taxpayers at the cost of in-
creased inequitable allocation of tax burdens among one-worker and
two-worker married couples because of the exclusion of home produc-
tion from the tax base.
13 Se I.R.C. § 44A (West Supp. 1983).
14 Tax Treatment Hearings, supra note 3, at 19; see also Gann, supra note 8, at 33 n.114
(table summarizing labor-force participation of wives since 1940).
15 See Gann, supra note 8, at 33 n. 114 (table summarizing labor-force participation rates
of wives since 1940).
16 See JOINT COMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 34.
17 See Gann, supra note 8, at 35 n.121.
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2. Comparison of Szgle Persons and Married Persons
The 1948 split-income plan lowered taxes for single persons when
they married, unless the spouses had equal, separate incomes before and
after marriage. This decrease in tax liability upon marriage has been
referred to as the "marriage bonus." Concomitantly, a single person
with the same income as a married couple paid substantially higher
taxes than the married couple. This higher tax liability has been re-
ferred to as the "single's penalty." In order to lessen this disparity, Con-
gress enacted a separate tax rate schedule for single persons in 1969,
which became effective in 1971.18 Under the separate schedule, the sin-
gle person's 1971 tax liability, at a given income level, was never more
than 120% of the tax liability of a married couple at the same level.
As a result of this new schedule for single taxpayers, some persons
paid a higher tax on their combined incomes after they married than
the sum of the separate taxes they paid when single. This increase in
taxes paid after marriage is referred to as the "marriage penalty." Table
119 displays the marriage penalty and marriage bonus under the 1979
rate schedules at varying levels of total income and varying divisions of
income between spouses. The penalty begins at approximately the
point when income is divided between the two persons more evenly than
eighty percent and twenty percent. The marriage penalty increases as
income is more evenly divided, reaching its maximum when the spouses
have equal incomes before and after marriage. Even when income is
fairly unevenly divided between the spouses, a substantial marriage pen-
alty can occur. Consider, for example, a married couple with a com-
bined income of $40,000. They incur a marriage penalty of $1,031, even
though the lesser-earning spouse contributes only thirty percent of the
income. The penalty increases to $1,692 when the income is divided
evenly.
As Table 1 also shows, the range of disparity between the tax liabil-
ities of married couples and their unmarried counterparts at the same
income levels is very substantial. When total family income is $40,000,
the range of disparity is $4,493 (from a marriage bonus of -$2,801 to a
marriage penalty of $1,692). At $50,000 the difference is as high as
$6,018, and at $100,000 as high as $7,858.
18 See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803, 83 Stat. 487, 678-85 (codified
at I.R.C. § 1).
19 Table 1 is reprinted from joirT CoMMrIrEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 29.
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The Treasury Department, in preparation for the 1980 congres-
sional hearings, 20 estimated the number of joint returns filed in 1979
with marriage bonuses or penalties. Economist David Feenberg later
published another estimate of the distribution of bonuses and penalties
in 1979.21 Table 2 summarizes their estimates of total returns filed with
marriage bonuses or penalties and the amounts of such bonuses or pen-
alties. Feenberg also estimates that 2.4 million joint returns in 1979 had
neither a marriage bonus nor penalty.22
TABLE 2
Number of Total Average Per
Returns Amount Return
Penalty
Treasury 15.9 million $ 8.34 billion $524
Feenberg 18.7 million 9.0 billion 481
Bonus
Treasury 23.8 million 19.16 billion 804
Feenberg 20.3 million 14.5 billion 714
Marital status has clearly affected the allocation of tax burdens among
single and married persons since 1948. The original split-income system
created the single's penalty and the marriage bonus; the creation of a
separate rate schedule in 1969 to lower the tax on single persons resulted
in the marriage penalty. The allocation of tax burdens based on marital
status as of 1979 can be summarized as follows:
1948: (1) Married couples with equal statutog income pay equal
taxes (even though married couples with equal economic in-
come may not pay equal taxes); and
(2) the consolidation on a joint return of the income of two
persons when they marry (where income is unevenly di-
vided between them) lowers their tax liability (the mar-
riage bonus).
1969: (1) Single persons do not pay more than 120% of the tax paid
by a married couple with the same total income (the sin-
gle's penalty); and
(2) single persons who have income more evenly divided than
an eighty percent-twenty percent division pay higher com-
bined taxes when they marry (the marriage penalty).
In what way did ERTA in 1981 modify these legislative decisions
concerning the relationship between marital status and the allocation of
income tax burdens?
20 See Tax Treatment Hearings, supra note 3, at 19, table 4.
21 See Feenberg, The Ta Treatment of Maried Couples and the 1981 Tax Law, Working
Paper No. 872, Nat'l Bur. of Econ. Res. 11, table 11.2 (1982).
22 . See id
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B. The Earned Income Deduction
By 1981, critics of the federal income tax system directed their pri-
mary assault at the Code's taxation of married persons. They made
three substantial criticisms. First, the marriage penalty discouraged
marriage and undermined respect for the family and for the tax system
itself.23 Second, the system, in adopting the view that married couples
with equal statutory income should pay equal taxes, failed to reflect in
the tax base the diminished income and home production of two-worker
couples compared to one-worker couples.24 Third, because the system
taxed the secondary worker's income at a higher marginal tax rate as a
result of consolidating income on the joint return, it discouraged the
secondary worker from working outside the home.25
These substantial concerns convinced Congress of the need for
modification of the system to eliminate or reduce the marriage penalty
on earned income. Code-reform advocates and various members of
Congress actively discussed three options: (1) mandatory separate filing
by all individuals; (2) optional separate filing by married persons under
the single-persons rate schedule; and (3) an earned income deduction
equal to a percentage of the earned income of the spouse with the lower
earnings. 26 Congress rejected the first two options to avoid the task of
developing rules to allocate income and deductions between the spouses'
separate returns and to preclude elimination of the marriage penalty
with respect to all types of income, when Congress's greatest concern
was the plight of the secondary worker.27
For many years tax commentators had advocated the third option,
the earned income deduction (EID), as a response to the inequities in
the taxation of one-worker and two-worker couples due to the flaws in
23 See SENATE COMM. ON FIN., ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAx ACT OF 1981, S. REP. No.
144, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 29, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 105, 136 [here-
inafter cited as SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT].
24 See Gann, supra note 8, at 30-31, 32; cf. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, Supra note
23, at 29, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 136 (two-worker couples incur
greater expenses in earning income than one-worker couples).
25 See SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 29, reprinted in 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 136.
26 See Marriage Tax Penalty: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management
Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (discussing proposed bills to
permit married persons to file single income tax returns, and to permit married couples to
deduct percentage of lower wage-earner's income); see also Sunley, Sunmay of the Conference
Discussion, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 261, 272 (J. Pechman ed. 1977) (discuss-
ing various options including EID and separate returns for married people); Bittker, supra
note 9, at 1434-37 (EID), 1437-42 (separate returns); Gann, supra note 8, at 36-39 (discussing
EID), 52-53 (discussing mandatory or optional separate filing of tax returns by married
persons).
27 See SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 30, reprinted in 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 137.
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the statutory measurement of the tax base.2 8 The ideal solution to the
problem would be inclusion in the income tax base of the value of goods
and services produced in the home. Because of the supposedly insur-
mountable administrative problems in measuring the amounts and val-
ues of these goods and services, however, tax commentators suggest the
EID as a proxy for the more ideal solution. Other commentators, how-
ever, have raised substantial and unanswered criticisms of this proxy.29
First, limiting the EID to two-worker couples leaves other new tax ineq-
uities between nonworker couples and one-worker couples and between
single persons and one-worker couples with the same statutory income. 30
The correct solution to these comparative inequities is to allow a deduc-
tion for all full-time workers, irrespective of marital status, scaled down
for part-time workers. Granting a deduction to all taxpayers who work
in the market place adjusts for the advantages associated with untaxed
imputed income from leisure and household goods and services. Sec-
ond, no economic studies exist to determine whether a particular deduc-
tion reflects the differences in amounts and values of imputed income of
one-worker and two-worker couples. The EID is an acceptable equita-
ble proxy for the value of household services only if evidence becomes
available to determine the proper size and distribution of such a
deduction.
Despite these convincing criticisms of the EID, Congress embraced
it in 1981 as the political solution to the marriage penalty on earned
income. ERTA added section 221 to the Code which, beginning with
the 1982 tax year, allows two-worker married couples to deduct five per-
cent of up to $30,000 of the lower of the spouses' earned incomes.31 This
percentage increases to ten percent in 1983 and years thereafter. For
example, if in 1983, both spouses have earned income and the lesser
28 See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 9, at 1434-36 (EID as percentage of second wage-earner's
income more plausible than allowance for employment related expenses); Gann, supra note 8,
at 36-37 (suggesting some form of EID as politically plausible solution to marriage penalty, in
lieu of including value of household goods and services in income tax base); Sunley,supra note
26, at 272 (comparing EID and separate filing system).
29 See Gann, supra note 8, at 36-38.
30 When neither spouse of a wealthy married couple works outside the home because the
couple can afford to live on income from property, the couple has property income plus the
household goods and services and leisure of two spouses. The one-worker couple benefits from
the household goods, services, and leisure of one spouse and, therefore, has a lower overall
standard of living than the nonworking couple with an equal statutory income. Thus, Con-
gress could appropriately give some allowance to the one-worker couple. But if this allowance
were made, the two-worker couple should receive two allowances. Further, because the sin-
gle-person household does not benefit from the household services and products of another
person, Congress could also appropriately give an allowance to a single person compared to a
one-worker married couple.
31 See I.R.C. § 221(b)(2) (1981) ("earned income" defined for purposes of measuring
amount of EID). For a description of this definition, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAxA-
TION, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX
ACT OF 1981, at 36 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMM. REPORT].
[Vol. 68:468
EARNED INCOME DEDUCTION
earned income of one spouse is $10,000, the EID will be $1,000. If the
lesser earned income of one spouse is $30,000 or greater, the maximum
EID of $3,000 will be allowed. What effects will this deduction have on
the taxation of married persons?
Equity analysis reveals little merit in the BID, for it is too narrow a
solution to the marriage penalty. The penalty occurs when couples have
separate incomes, whether from property or services, and one spouse's
income is at least twenty percent of the couple's total income. Because
the EID is limited to a percentage of the earned income of two-worker
couples, it does not eliminate the marriage penalty resulting from
unearned income. Congress was, of course, aware of this effect, but
chose to reduce the marriage penalty only for two-worker married
couples.32
Moreover, the EID only partially alleviates the marriage penalty of
two-worker couples. Two provisions of ERTA affect the amount of the
marriage penalty. One provision is the EID. The other is the reduction
of all tax schedule rates by twenty-three percent by 1984,33 and the si-
multaneous reduction of the highest marginal tax rate on unearned in-
come from seventy percent to fifty percent as of January 1, 1982.34
Table 3 compares the marriage penalty paid by couples with evenly di-
vided earned income under the rate schedules effective prior to ERTA,
with the estimated marriage penalty to be paid by these couples in 1984
when the full twenty-three percent rate reduction is in effect. 35 The ta-
ble uses an even division of income because the maximum marriage
penalty occurs at this division.36 In order to make a proper comparison,
the 1980 income levels were increased by the percentage change in the
Consumer Price Index from 1980 through 1984, 37 on the assumption
that the couples' earned income would also increase at this rate. The
table reflects the 1984 tax rates as applied to the adjusted incomes to
32 See SENATE FINANcE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 30, reprinted in 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 137.
33 See I.R.C. § 1(a) (as amended by ERTA, supra note 7, at § 101(a), 95 Stat. 176-82)
(tables of reductions scheduled for 1981, 1982, and subsequent years).
34 See id
35 The report of the Joint Committee on Taxation accompanying ERTA contains a
table comparing the marriage penalty at various income levels and divisions of income under
prior law and under ERTA applying the 1984 tax rates. JOINT COMM. REPORT, su ra note
31, at 35, table IV-6. The table does not distinguish the effect of ERTA's rate reductions
from the effect of the EID. Moreover, the table does not state whether the various income
levels were adjusted to reflect inflation since 1979. The omission suggests that the calculations
probably did not incorporate an inflation index. Failure to increase the income levels to 1984
dollars will overstate the effect of ERTA's rate reduction and understate the effect of the EID
on the amount of the marriage penalty in 1984.
36 See supra Table I and text following note 1.8.
37 The Consumer Price Index for 1980 was 247.0. Table 3 reflects annual percentage
changes as follows: 1981-10.2%; 1982--8% (estimated); 1983-7% (estimated); 1984-7%
(estimated). See 105 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 73 (1982).
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'determine taxes owed for 1984. Finally, the taxes so determined were
discounted to 1980 dollars to quantify the marriage penalty before and
after the EID and to evaluate the percentage of the marriage penalty
alleviated by the ERTA provisions. These calculations ignore, however,
the likely labor supply responses of spouses to these provisions and as-
sume that couples will show no behavioral response.
The figures in Table 3 show that when a married couple's income is
evenly divided, the rate reductions roughly offset the effects of inflation
at the middle-income levels, those from $20,000 to $50,000. The
amount of the marriage penalty, therefore, is not substantially reduced.
The rate reduction at the higher income levels of $60,000 and $70,000
moderately reduces the penalty by eighteen and twenty-three percent,
respectively. The EID does reduce the penalty that would be paid
under the 1984 rate schedule. The amount of the reduction decreases
from approximately fifty-six percent at lower income levels to thirty-one
percent at higher income levels. Although the EID reduces the maxi-
mum penalty paid by married couples with evenly divided income, it
still leaves a significant marriage penalty, particularly at income levels
of $40,000 and above.
Because the marriage penalty generally does not occur unless the
lesser-earning spouse's income is at least twenty percent of the couple's
total income, the EID should increase the marriage bonus for couples
whose secondary earner contributes less than twenty percent of the total
income. Table 4 compares the marriage bonus enjoyed by couples with
ninety percent-ten percent earned income contributions under the rate
schedules immediately prior to ERTA with the estimated marriage bo-
nus that these couples will enjoy in 1984. The comparative amounts of
marriage bonus for 1980 and 1984 are given in 1980 dollars, the same as
the marriage penalty in Table 3.38 Table 4 shows that the ERTA rate
reductions did not counteract totally the effects of inflation from 1980
through 1984, so that at income levels of $10,000 to $50,000, the bonus
actually declines. The allowance of the EID substantially offsets these
declines. The combined effects of the rate reduction and the EID re-
duce marriage bonuses at income levels from $10,000 to $40,000 very
little, and substantially increase the marriage bonuses at income levels of
$60,000 and above.
Economist Daniel Feenberg has conducted a study that estimates
the distribution and magnitude of the marriage bonus and
38 See supra text accompanying note 37.
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CORNELL LAW REVIEW
marriage penalty in 1979 and then in 1983 (with the rate reductions as
of 1983) before and after the EID.3 9 Table 5 presents his conclusions.40
Table 6 summarizes from Table 5 the estimated effect of the ERTA
rate reductions and the EID on marriage neutrality in tax treatment
between 1979 and 1983.
TABLE 6
Summary of Changes From 1979-1983 Toward Greater
or Lesser Overall Marriage Neutrality by ERTA
(In Billions of Dollars)
Marriage Bonus Marriage Penalty Net
(Decrease is (Decrease is Improvement
Negative) Negative) (Negative)
ERTA Rate
Reductions
(comparison of
1979 with
1983 before
EID) $ -1.5 $ .3 $ -1.2
Earned
Income
Deduction
(comparison of
1983 before
and after EID) 1.7 -2.0 -. 31
Total $ .2 $-1.7 $ -1.5
The ERTA rate reductions through 1983 decrease the total marriage
bonus by $1.5 billion ($14.5 to $13 billion). Notwithstanding these rate
reductions, the marriage penalty increases $.3 billion ($9 to $9.3 billion).
Thus, the net overall movement toward marriage neutrality because of
rate reductions is $1.2 billion. The EID produces the opposite effects. It
increases the marriage bonus after the ERTA rate reductions by $1.7
billion ($13 to $14.7 billion), and decreases the marriage penalty by $2.0
billion ($9.3 to $7.3 billion). Thus, the net overall improvement toward
marriage neutrality due to the EID is $.3 billion. In combination, the
ERTA rate reductions substantially reduce the marriage bonus, and the
EID substantially reduces the marriage penalty. The EID, however,
also increases the marriage bonus and by an amountgreater than the rate
reduction's decrease in the marriage bonus. Consequently, the overall
net improvement toward marriage neutrality is $1.5 billion, and the
39 Feenberg, supra note 21, at 11-20.
40 See id at 11, table 11.2; id at 20, table 14. In determining the marriage bonuses and
penalties, Feenberg assumes a nominal income growth of 1.49 from 1979 to 1983, and deduc-
tions and exemptions allocated in proportion to income. Id at 7-8.
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EID's contribution of $.3 billion toward that overall improvement is
small relative to the ERTA rate reductions' $1.2 billion contribution.
The last column of Table 5 shows the following effects of the EID.
First, it demonstrates that the EID increases the total marriage bonus
for couples receiving a marriage bonus prior to the EID from $13 to
$13.4 billion. Thus, although the total increase in the marriage bonus
due to the EID is $1.7 billion, only $.4 billion goes to those married
couples with a marriage bonus prior to the EID; the remaining $1.3
billion goes to additional couples whose taxes, prior to the EID, would
reflect marriage neutrality or a marriage penalty. Correspondingly, the
last column takes the set of married couples who would receive a total
marriage penalty of $9.3 billion in 1983 prior to the EID, and demon-
strates that the EID would reduce the marriage penalty to $6.1 billion.
Part of this $3.2 billion tax savings, however, shifts some couples from
the marriage penalty set of couples into the set of couples with marriage
neutrality or marriage bonuses, so that the actual remaining total mar-
riage penalty after the deduction is $7.3 billion. Thus, a substantial ef-
fect of the EID is to shift married couples from the set of couples who
pay a marriage penalty to the set of couples who receive a marriage
bonus.
The ERTA changes thus create a $1.5 billion overall improvement
toward marriage neutrality. The ERTA rate reduction and the EID
contribute $1.2 billion and $.3 billion, respectively. Table 7 summarizes
from Table 5 the estimated percentage of joint tax returns that reflect
marriage bonuses, penalties, or neither in 1979 and 1983.
TABLE 7
Estimated Percentage of Joint Returns with
Marriage Bonus, Marriage Penalty, or
Neither Bonus nor Penalty
1979 1983 1983
(Before EID) (After EID)
Marriage Bonus 49.1% 48.1% 52.9%
Neither Bonus Nor Penalty 5.8 5.9 6.2
Marriage Penalty 45.1 46.0 40.9
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
As a result of ERTA, the percentage of returns showing neither a mar-
riage bonus nor a marriage penalty increases from 5.8% to 6.2%; the
percentage with a marriage bonus increases from 49.1% to 52.9%; the
percentage with a marriage penalty decreases from 45.1% to 40.9%. The
EID shifts married couples from the set paying a marriage penalty to
the set receiving a marriage bonus. Thus, the deduction contributes a
small proportion of the overall movement toward marriage neutrality
and has the more important effect of shifting couples from the penalty
1983]
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to the bonus category. Meanwhile, as Tables 3 and 5 show, many
couples continue to pay a substantial marriage penalty. The EID there-
fore cannot be explained as an effort to promote marriage neutrality.
Does it serve the end of efficiency?
C. Marital Status under Efficiency Criteria
The joint return filing for married couples is inefficient.4 ' Our tax
base excludes the value of goods and services produced in the home,
thereby encouraging a greater production of such goods and services
than would occur if the tax system were neutral between home and mar-
ket production. Inefficiency is not limited to the joint return, but ap-
plies as well to all individual taxpayers. The joint return, however, adds
to inefficiency because it aggregates the market income of two taxpayers
on a single return under a graduated tax rate schedule. This causes the
marginal tax rate on increased market production relative to the tax
rate of zero on home production to be higher than if the market income
were taxed on separate returns.
The exclusion of home production from the tax base and the aggre-
gation of market income on the joint return are gender neutral on the
surface. Using elasticities of supply of labor, however, economists have
shown that these features of our tax system discourage wives from work-
ing outside the home. Statistical studies show that the labor supply elas-
ticity of husbands is relatively low and that of wives is relatively high.42
Wives, therefore, tend to view themselves as the secondary worker and
are more likely than their husbands to perform the couple's home pro-
duction.4 3 If a married couple is considering whether to perform more
market production and less home production, the couple will typically
consider whether the wife should perform the additional work outside
the home and hire a housekeeper for the home production. In making
this decision, the married couple will compare the after-tax wage of the
wife, taxed at their joint-return marginal rate minus the nondeductible
costs for the housekeeper, against the nontaxed value of the wife's home
production that they will lose if she goes to work. Economists argue,
therefore, that if the wife filed a separate tax return, she would be more
likely to work outside the home, because the marginal tax rate on the
income from market production would typically be lower than the mar-
41 For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see Gann, supra note 8, at 39-46.
42 See, e.g., Boskin, The Economics of Labor Supp y, in INCOME MAINTENANCE AND LABOR
SUPPLY 163, 164 (E. Cain & H. Watts eds. 1973); Hall, Wages, Income and Hours of Work in the
US Labor Force, in INCOME MAINTENANCE AND ABOR SUPPLY 102, 124-29 (E. Cain & H.
Watts eds. 1973).
43 See, e.g., H. ROSEN, APPLICATIONS OF OPTIMAL TAx THEORY TO PROBLEMS IN TAX-
ING FAMILIES AND INDIVIDUALS 17-18 (Dep't of Treas., Office of Tax Policy Analysis Paper
No. 21, Nov. 1976); Rosen, Taxes in a Labor Suppy Model with Joint- Wage-Hours Determinations,
44 ECONOMETRICA 485, 490-501 (1976).
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ginal tax rate applicable under-the joint return. Economic studies show-
ing that the labor-force participation rates of women increase with an
increase, in after-tax wages firmly support this argument.44 Because
wives are more likely than husbands to be secondary earners, ERTA's
EID should have the effect of increasing the after-tax wages of wives and
thereby increasing their labor-force participation rates. Economist
Daniel Feenberg has estimated the effects of ERTA's EID on such
rates.45 His study concludes that the EID will have the relatively mod-
est effect of increasing the labor-force participation of wives by an aver-
age of fifteen hours per year.46 Prior economic studies indicate that if
Congress abolished joint returns and required all taxpayers to file sepa-
rate returns, wives' labor-force participation rates would be substan-
tially greater than under the ERTA system of joint returns with the
EID, and consequently, separate returns would be more efficient than
joint returns. 47
Thus, the EID contributes little to marriage neutrality, but does
contribute some gains under efficiency criteria. Apparently, Congress
intended to extend the EID to those couples who enjoyed marriage bo-
nuses prior to ERTA, thereby increasing their bonuses and decreasing
marriage nonneutrality, in order to provide some efficiency gains to
these couples. 48
D. A System of Separate Filing for all Individuals
This writer has argued before that marital status should have no
bearing on income tax rates, and that the best solution to the problem is
a marriage-neutral income tax under which all individuals file separate
returns.49 The discussion in this article of the effects of the enactment of
the EID confirms this position under both equity and efficiency criteria.
The chief equity argument in favor of the split-income, joint return
filing system for married couples has been that married couples share
44 See Rosen, supra note 43, at 503.
45 See Feenberg, supra note 21.
46 See id at 39.
47 See Feenberg & Rosen, Alternative Tax Treatments of the Famiy, Simulation Methodology and
Results, Working Paper No. 497, Nat'l Bur. of Econ. Res. (1980); Rosen, A Methodology for
Evaluating Tax Reform Proposals, 6 J. PuB. ECON. 105, 112-16 (1976).
48 The Joint Committee Report accompanying ERTA states that Congress preferred
the EID to filing separate returns in part because "separate filing would have reduced taxes
only for couples affected by the marriage penalty, but the Congress believed that there should
be a tax reduction for all two-earner married couples." JOINT COMM. REPORT, supra note 31,
at 34.
49 See Gann, supra note 8, at 32-36, 67-69. The structural problems inherent in a
separate filing system, such as income attribution and allocation of deductions between
spouses, were also discussed at length. See id at 42-67. Congress adopted in ERTA one of the
structural modifications supported in that article. See I.R.C. § 2523(1) (as amended by
ERTA, supra note 7, at § 403, 95 Stat. 301-05) (exempting interspousal transfers from estate
and gift tax base).
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their consolidated income equally. This argument is dubious, however,
because it is unlikely that all couples at all income levels adopt this shar-
ing pattern. Moreover, limiting the joint return system to married
couples is too narrow because it ignores the substantial sharing between
single persons. 50 These shortcomings of the "sharing" argument, how-
ever, led Congress to lower substantially the tax rates of single people by
establishing a separate single-person rate schedule in 1969. The result-
ing disparity between the two rate schedules caused both the marriage
bonus and the marriage penalty, the distribution and magnitude of
which cannot be independently justified under equity criteria as proper
allocations of tax burdens based on marital status.
Political compromises like the EID result from Congress's steadfast
determination to maintain the principle that "equal-income married
couples pay equal taxes" as the central equity criterion of our tax sys-
tem, notwithstanding the fact that one-worker married couples are a
diminishing group of taxpayers. Congress apparently thought in 1981
that the EID would-minimize complaints about both the failure to ac-
count for the value of household work when computing the tax base and
the marriage penalty, while preserving the joint return. This 1981 re-
sponse to both problems, however, is inadequate. As a proxy for the
failure to tax home production, the EID has no statistical foundation to
legitimize its size or distribution among married couples. Moreover, as a
proxy it is too narrow because it should be extended to all taxpayers,
whether married or single, who participate in the labor force. The EID
may indeed modestly decrease the marriage penalty, but it will simulta-
neously increase the marriage bonus substantially.
A system of individual tax returns under a single tax rate schedule
responds adequately to most of the complaints against the present sys-
tem. A marriage-neutral system would eliminate all the various penal-
ties and bonuses. Moreover, by rejecting the joint return, it would
eliminate the disparate treatment of one-worker and two-worker
couples. It also would eliminate the substantial efficiency loss under the
joint return system. The individual tax return system by itself is no pan-
acea; even greater equity and efficiency would be achieved by including
the value of home production in the tax base. Elimination of the joint
50 Some argue, however, that the sharing principle is fairly limited to married persons
for the administrative reason that the status of marriage provides an easily administered and
objective test of sharing. This argument is unconvincing. The administrative-ease argument
loses its forcefulness as the results under that system appear increasingly arbitrary because of
the decreasing social and legal importance of the status of marriage in our society.
France's tax system provides an interesting contrast to our joint return approach. Since
1982, France has imposed a wealth tax at a progressive rate from .5% to 1.5% on fiscal house-
holds whose taxable net worth exceeds 3 million francs. Fiscal households include unmarried
cohabiting couples. Loi No. 81-1160, du 30 drcembre 1981, art. 3, reprinted in 1982 D.S.L. 22
(Jan. 27, 1982).
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return isolates this issue, however, so that Congress might address it
without blending or confusing it with the marriage penalty. Congress
could then more rationally focus on whether all taxpayers with earned
income should obtain an EID to eliminate the federal tax system's bias
in favor of unearned income and imputed income from home
production.
By retaining the joint return and adding the EID in 1981, Congress
again illustrated its tendency to temporize. Only by adopting a system
of individual tax returns and eliminating marital status as a factor in the
determination of tax rates will Congress provide an acceptable long-
term resolution of the appropriate filing-unit issue.
